The AI Backlash: Why the Public Turned on AI's Winners
People are not rejecting AI; they use it more every month. They are rejecting a deal in which the gains seem to go to a few. History says that verdict is how the gains eventually get shared.
Executive summary
The public is not turning against artificial intelligence because it has tried the tools and found them useless. It is turning against the people and companies who seem set to keep the gains. In September 2026 about three in four battleground voters in Iowa, Michigan and Ohio said AI will make billionaires richer, about one in five said it would do the same for American workers, and only two in five working voters were worried about their own job. Use keeps climbing while approval falls. That is the signature of a fight over power and distribution, and the movement now has a fitting name: AI populism.
The anger has found a physical target in the data centre, where AI's costs, power, water and tax breaks, land on one town while its rewards flow to shareholders far away. It is concentrated in the rich democracies of North America, Europe and Australia, and among the young; across most of Asia the public still sees AI as a net benefit. And it is not, mostly, a reaction to AI-driven inflation. The 2026 cost-of-living squeeze is an oil shock, while AI investment is propping up growth that a small share of households captures.
History gives the deepest reason to take this seriously, and the most hopeful one. In Britain's industrial revolution, output per worker rose 46% between 1780 and 1840 while real wages rose 12%; the catch-up came only in the next sixty years, after decades of conflict over who got what. Every general-purpose technology has had this first phase. The public's verdict on AI is a rational reading of where we are in that cycle, and the backlash is how the bargain over the second phase begins. Whether it produces rules, a public share and community consent, or moratoria and a frozen build-out, is the hinge of the next five years.
Why the mood is now part of the AI story
The AI revolution has been told as a story about models, chips and capital. Public consent was treated as a given. It no longer is. Building AI at the scale the labs plan needs land, grid connections, water, tax treatment and permission from elected officials, and every one of those now runs through voters who are souring. Frontier labs are preparing public listings that will turn retail investors into owners and ordinary citizens into stakeholders. Political money from the industry is flowing into the 2026 midterms.
So the question of who the public thinks AI is for has stopped being a question of mood and become a constraint on the build-out itself. Understanding the backlash, its causes, its geography and its historical rhyme, is now part of understanding where the technology goes.
The backlash has a name, AI populism, and it is about power
There is already a word for anger at big technology companies. "Techlash" first appeared in The Economist in 2013 and was shortlisted for Oxford Dictionaries' word of the year in 2018, defined as a strong and widespread negative reaction to the power of large technology firms. But techlash was about privacy, social media and monopoly. What is forming around AI is broader and more political.
The term that has stuck in 2026 comes from the tech writer Jasmine Sun, who in April published an essay titled "AI Populism's Warning Shot". She described AI populism as a worldview in which AI is seen not simply as a technology to adopt but as an elite political project to be resisted. The essay followed the most violent week the industry has seen. On 10 April a 20-year-old threw a Molotov cocktail at Sam Altman's San Francisco home, setting a gate alight; he was arrested an hour later at OpenAI's headquarters. According to The New Republic, he had written a manifesto calling for violence against AI executives and described himself online as a "butlerian jihadist", a reference to the war on thinking machines in Frank Herbert's Dune. Three days earlier, thirteen shots had been fired into the Indianapolis home of councillor Ron Gibson, who had backed a local data-centre project; a note at the door read "No Data Centers".
Those acts are extreme outliers. The mass of evidence is in polling, and it points one way. A September 2026 Data for Progress survey of more than 3,100 likely voters in Iowa, Michigan and Ohio found majorities unfavourable to the AI industry in all three states, and about three-quarters who disagreed that AI executives care about people like them. Yet only about two in five employed voters feared for their own job, and roughly half rarely or never used AI tools. Among those who said AI had touched their lives, at least twice as many called the effect good as bad. The authors' conclusion was that negativity does not arise from personal experience or job fear. It is about who profits, who is watching and who is in charge.
So should the movement have a name, and what should it be? "Neo-Luddite" misreads it, because most critics are not trying to smash the machines. "Techlash" is too narrow. "AI populism" fits the evidence best, because it puts the conflict where the data says it lives: between a public and an elite it believes is capturing a technology. The plain phrase "the AI backlash" will remain the everyday term. The more precise one matters because it tells you what would answer it, which is not better products but a different deal.
Data centres turned an abstract technology into a neighbour
For most people AI is something on a screen. A data centre is a building the size of several football fields at the end of the road, drawing as much power as a small city. That is where AI populism became concrete.
The scale of resistance in the United States is unprecedented. Data Center Watch, a tracking project run by the research firm 10a Labs, counted at least 75 projects worth about $130 billion blocked or delayed in the first quarter of 2026, roughly as much as in all of 2025. The number of active opposition groups more than doubled from the end of 2025 and now spans 49 states. More than 300 state bills on data centres were filed in the first six weeks of the year, and statewide moratorium proposals appeared in 14 states. A second-quarter tally put a further 45 projects worth about $68 billion in the disrupted column, a figure that mixes delays with cancellations.
The most striking numbers come from the states that host the industry, starting with Virginia, home to the cluster known as Data Center Alley.
Fewer than half as many Virginians now welcome a data centre nearby as did in 2023, and support for tax breaks to lure them has collapsed alongside. In the same poll 57% said data centres hurt household energy bills and only 14% said they help, even though a majority still credited them with creating jobs. For comparison, a 2023 Post-University of Maryland poll found 33% of Americans would be comfortable with a nuclear power plant nearby: data centres are approaching that level of local tolerance. In Wisconsin, the Marquette Law School poll found the share saying data centres' costs outweigh their benefits rose from 55% in October 2025 to 70% in February 2026, and a July poll put it at 76%. The swing came overwhelmingly from Democrats and independents; Republicans were already sceptical.
The fight has reached the top of politics. In March, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced a bill for a national moratorium on new AI data centres until federal AI rules exist. It has little chance of passing, and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum called a moratorium a "surrender flag" to China. In April, Maine's legislature passed the first statewide pause on new data centres of 20 megawatts or more; Governor Janet Mills vetoed it only because it lacked an exemption for a $550 million project in the town of Jay, and said she still favoured a moratorium.
The industry has noticed. Microsoft launched a "Community-First AI Infrastructure" initiative in January, promising to cover utility costs its sites create and limit water use, though without independent oversight. OpenAI's April policy paper proposed that data centres pay their own energy costs and generate local jobs and tax revenue. The lesson of the data-centre fight is simple: when the costs of a technology are local and visible and its gains are distant and private, consent evaporates. Every promise that offers a town a share of the gains, not just a share of the noise, is the industry quietly conceding that point.
The polls agree: Americans use AI more and like it less
Several reliable instruments track public sentiment, and they now tell a consistent story in the United States. The longest-running is Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel, which has asked the same question since 2021: does the increased use of AI in daily life make you more concerned or more excited?
The shape matters. Concern jumped by 14 points between 2022 and 2023, the year generative AI reached the mass market, and has stayed at about half the country since. Excitement has halved, to under one in ten. What changed most recently is who is worried: in 2026, for the first time, a majority of Americans under 30 said they were more concerned than excited. Gallup's survey for the Walton Family Foundation found Gen Z's excitement about AI fell from 36% to 22% in a year while anger rose from 22% to 31%. Pew found 71% of Americans now expect AI to mean fewer jobs over the next twenty years, up from 64% in 2024.
Other trackers confirm the direction. Quinnipiac found 55% of Americans in March 2026 expected AI to do more harm than good in their daily lives, up from 44% eleven months earlier. An NBC News poll of registered voters in early March found 26% viewed AI positively and 46% negatively, a net rating of minus 20, slightly below Immigration and Customs Enforcement at minus 18. The Stanford AI Index, which compiles these surveys, found the starkest gap of all between the builders and the public: 73% of AI experts expect a positive effect on how people do their jobs, against 23% of Americans; 69% of experts expect a positive effect on the economy, against 21%.
The paradox is that usage is rising. NBC found 56% of voters had used an AI platform in recent months; Gallup found half of Gen Z use AI weekly. People are not refusing the tools. They are using them while concluding that the system around them is not built for them. That gap between use and approval is the clearest sign that the backlash is about power rather than product.
Outside the West, the mood runs the other way
The global picture is not a simple slide into pessimism, and that is one of the most important things the data shows. Ipsos's AI Monitor, the largest annual cross-country survey, found the share of people across 30 countries saying AI products and services offer more benefits than drawbacks actually rose, from 55% in 2024 to 59% in 2025, even as the share saying AI makes them nervous edged up to 52%. Its 2026 edition, covering 32 countries, found excitement and nervousness roughly level worldwide, often in the same people.
The divide is geographic. In China, Indonesia and Thailand around four in five adults see more benefit than harm; in Canada, the United States and the Netherlands it is closer to two in five. Pew's 2025 survey of 25 countries found a median of 34% more concerned than excited, with the highest shares, around half, in the United States, Italy, Australia, Brazil and Greece, and among the lowest in South Korea. Southeast Asians are also the most trusting of their own governments to regulate AI: 81% in Singapore and 76% in Indonesia, against 31% in the United States, the lowest of any country surveyed. Some Western countries have actually warmed since 2022: on the benefits question Germany rose 12 points and France 10. The exception that bears watching is India, where nervousness about AI rose 14 points in a single year, the sharpest rise of any country surveyed.
The physical backlash is global too. A New York Times investigation traced fights from Mexico, where residents near a Microsoft site reported water outages lasting weeks, to Ireland, where campaigners won limits on new data centres around Dublin. In Chile, Google withdrew plans for a data centre in Cerrillos after protests over water use in a drought-stricken area. In London, PauseAI and Pull the Plug led what MIT Technology Review called the city's biggest anti-AI march yet in February 2026, a few hundred people through King's Cross; in San Francisco a similar crowd marched past the offices of Anthropic, OpenAI and xAI.
What do we learn? Where AI arrives with rising incomes, trusted governments and a sense of national ascent, the public is optimistic. Where it arrives on top of stagnant wages, low institutional trust and visible inequality, the same technology reads as a threat. The backlash tracks the social contract more than the software.
The AI pure-plays and their founders take the hit
There is no tracker that measures each AI company's standing with one consistent question over years, which is itself telling: the public has formed views on these firms faster than pollsters have measured them. Piecing together what exists, a clear pattern emerges, company by company.
OpenAI is the best-known and the most exposed. In the Data for Progress battleground survey a majority of voters in all three states viewed it unfavourably. Its chief executive, Sam Altman, is unknown to about three in five voters, yet those who know him are negative: his net rating was minus 21 in Iowa and Michigan and minus 18 in Ohio. In the Axios Harris Poll 100 corporate-reputation ranking, published in May, OpenAI fell by double digits, according to Quartz's reading of the list, and its reputation turned partisan, with Republicans rating it 12 points higher than Democrats against just one point in 2024. OpenAI's president Greg Brockman is a major funder of Leading the Future, the industry super PAC opposing state AI rules.
Anthropic, which brands itself as the safety-first lab and has reportedly committed $40 million to Public First Action, a group that pushes for AI guardrails, is not spared. About half of battleground voters had not heard enough to rate it, and those who had leaned negative, giving it a double-digit net unfavourable rating. Being the pro-regulation lab has not yet bought a reputational premium.
Meta and its founder carry an older deficit: two-thirds of Americans viewed Mark Zuckerberg unfavourably in Pew's 2025 survey, and Meta sits among the less-liked firms in the 2026 Harris ranking. Elon Musk, whose xAI builds Grok, is polarising rather than simply unpopular: 54% of Americans viewed him unfavourably in 2025, split sharply by party, and Tesla's reputation actually rebounded in the 2026 ranking. Microsoft, the company most tied to OpenAI, dropped 21 places to 24th, again according to Quartz's analysis.
The firms that kept their standing are the ones that sell things people already understand. Nvidia ranked fourth of 100 in the Harris list; Apple, Alphabet and Amazon scored "very good". The lesson is that reputation follows who a company appears to serve. The labs whose product is AI itself, whose founders talk openly about replacing work and whose valuations depend on it, are absorbing the anger. Companies that look like useful suppliers, or that spend less and promise less, are not.
AI is propping up growth, not driving the cost-of-living crisis
A common intuition holds that AI is sucking capital out of the rest of the economy and driving up prices for everyone. The evidence supports half of that.
The capital is real. The four largest cloud companies, Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta, guided this spring to roughly $700 billion to $725 billion of capital spending in 2026, up from about $410 billion in 2025. ING estimates AI investment now accounts for roughly a third of US GDP growth this year, and its broadest technology measure accounts for about half of year-on-year growth in the second quarter. The IMF has credited AI investment with holding up world growth. Without the AI build-out, the US economy would be noticeably weaker.
But the price squeeze of 2026 has a different main cause.
US inflation reached 3.7% in September, but prices excluding food and energy rose only 2.6%. Energy prices rose 20.4% and gasoline 34.2%, after Iran's Revolutionary Guard declared the Strait of Hormuz closed in March and tanker traffic through the route that carries about a fifth of the world's crude collapsed. Electricity, where data centres genuinely add pressure, rose 4.4%. How much of that comes from data-centre demand rather than fuel costs and grid upgrades is disputed, and public data cannot cleanly separate the two.
So the honest answer to "is everyone worse off because the money is flowing into AI?" is no, not mainly, but the perception is not irrational. Mark Zandi of Moody's Analytics estimates that over the past three years real spending by the top fifth of households grew close to 4% after inflation, while the bottom 80% saw close to zero growth. The AI boom shows up as rising share prices, and the Federal Reserve's distributional accounts show the top 1% of households hold about half of all directly and indirectly owned US equities, while the bottom half holds about 1%. Meanwhile the promised productivity payoff has not yet reached most firms: a February 2026 NBER study of nearly 6,000 executives in four countries found about nine in ten reported no effect of AI on productivity or employment over the previous three years. And the costs are landing on the young first. Stanford's Digital Economy Lab found employment of 22-to-25-year-olds in the most AI-exposed occupations is now 19% below where it would be had it tracked less-exposed peers, up from 13% in the study's first version a year earlier.
Put together: AI is not causing the cost-of-living crisis, but it is making a small group very rich during one, while its benefits to everyone else remain a forecast. That is precisely the condition in which a backlash about fairness forms.
History says output comes first and wages come decades later
The most useful lens on this moment is not the dot-com bubble but the first industrial revolution. In 1811, textile workers in Nottinghamshire began breaking the knitting frames that were undercutting their trade. The Luddites, as they called themselves, were not against machinery as such; they targeted the machines owners used to cut wages and skill. Parliament made frame-breaking a capital offence in 1812, and mass trials at York in 1813 ended in executions and transportation to Australia. Their name became an insult for anyone who fears technology, which is a misreading of what they fought about.
What they lived through has a name in economic history. The economist Robert Allen called it "Engels' pause", after Friedrich Engels, who described the misery of Manchester's workers in the 1840s.
For sixty years the gains of the new machines went overwhelmingly to profits. Only between 1840 and 1900 did wages finally outrun output, rising 123% against 90%. Economic historians still debate the exact figures, which rest on reconstructed wage series, but the shape is widely accepted. Allen's explanation is that the new technology raised productivity while the owners of capital captured the return, and wages caught up only once capital accumulation made labour scarce enough to bid them up.
The computer age offers a milder rhyme. In 1987 the Nobel economist Robert Solow wrote that "you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics". When the productivity did arrive in the late 1990s, it was shared unevenly. The Economic Policy Institute calculates that US productivity rose about 87% between 1979 and 2024 while a typical worker's hourly pay rose about 32%. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, who later shared a Nobel prize for work on institutions, built their 2023 book Power and Progress around this pattern across a thousand years: technology raises output, but its gains are shared only when the direction of innovation and the division of its proceeds are pushed away from a narrow elite.
What does the past say about the future? First, the public's pessimism is not ignorance. It is an accurate read of the first phase of a general-purpose technology. Second, the backlash is not a detour from the story. On Acemoglu and Johnson's reading of history, the conflict over distribution is the mechanism that eventually turns productivity into broad prosperity. The Luddites lost their fight; the gains reached workers only later, and only as their bargaining power grew. The question for AI is whether that bargaining happens in decades, as it did then, or faster.
Richer is not the same as happier
The grandest promise made for AI is not just abundance but flourishing: that machines doing the work will leave everyone materially rich, fulfilled and happy. Behind that promise sits an assumption worth testing, that wealth and happiness move together.
At the level of the individual, they largely do. In 2023 Matthew Killingsworth, Daniel Kahneman and Barbara Mellers settled a long dispute in the journal PNAS. Earlier work had suggested happiness stops rising at an income of around $75,000. Re-analysing a large sample of real-time mood reports, they found that for most people happiness keeps rising with income, even at high incomes; only for the least happy fifth does extra money stop helping, because what makes them unhappy is something money does not fix.
At the level of whole nations, the relationship is weaker. The economist Richard Easterlin found, in a 2010 study across 37 countries, that over periods of ten years or more, rising national income was not accompanied by rising life satisfaction, even though in the short run, booms and busts did move happiness. Economists such as Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers dispute the finding. But the most common explanation for it is relevant here: people judge their lives partly in comparison with others, and they value security and control as well as consumption. When everyone gets richer together, the comparison does not change.
The implication for AI is direct. A world in which AI lifts average material wealth but concentrates it, and in which people lose control over their work and their towns, could be richer on paper and unhappier in fact. The backlash data already hints at this: what people object to is not a lack of gadgets but a loss of standing and say. Abundance alone will not buy consent. Security, dignity and a fair share of the gains are what the happiness research suggests people actually need.
The dream of shared AI wealth is alive; trust in its delivery is not
The industry's leaders once offered a concrete answer to the distribution problem. In March 2021, Sam Altman published "Moore's Law for Everything", proposing an American Equity Fund financed by an annual 2.5% levy on the market value of large companies and on private land, which he estimated would pay each American adult about $13,500 a year within a decade. In May 2025 Anthropic's chief executive Dario Amodei warned that AI could eliminate half of entry-level white-collar jobs within five years and push unemployment to between 10% and 20%, and urged leaders to stop sugar-coating it.
The evidence on basic income itself is more modest than either the dream or its critics suggest. OpenResearch, a lab Altman funded, gave 1,000 low-income Americans $1,000 a month for three years. Recipients worked about 1.3 to 1.4 fewer hours a week, spent more on essentials and helped relatives, and their mental-health gains faded after the first year. We covered that study in depth in our universal basic income episode, number 31, released in July: cash reliably eases poverty but cannot replace the purpose and status that work provides.
What has collapsed is not the appetite for sharing the gains but faith that the gains will be shared voluntarily. In 2017, a Gallup-Northeastern survey found Americans split 48 to 52 on a basic income for workers displaced by AI. In June 2026, a Verasight poll found 69% backed requiring large AI firms to hand half their stock to a public wealth fund, and 64% still did when the idea was attributed to Bernie Sanders. Just Capital found about 65% think everyone should get a direct financial benefit from the wealth AI companies generate. In the battleground states, majorities including Republicans supported a basic income funded by a tax on AI companies.
The industry has moved toward the same ground. OpenAI's April 2026 paper, "Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age", floated a Public Wealth Fund, higher taxes on top capital gains and on sustained AI-driven returns, and pilots of a 32-hour week at full pay. Critics noted it did not say how the fund would be financed, and that OpenAI's own president funds a super PAC fighting state AI rules.
So what do researchers say, and where are we landing? The lesson is the one Acemoglu and Johnson draw from history: shared prosperity is negotiated, not gifted. The public has absorbed that lesson faster than the industry. It no longer believes the promise of a dividend from the people who would have to pay it, and it is increasingly willing to take one by law. The dream has not died; it has changed hands, from a gift the builders would give to a claim the public intends to make.
Where this lands: the backlash is the bargaining
The economic stakes are clear. AI investment is now load-bearing for US growth, and that investment depends on permits, power and political tolerance that are eroding. The political stakes are sharpening. Industry-aligned super PACs, Leading the Future on one side and the Anthropic-funded Public First network on the other, had spent $55.7 million on the 2026 midterms by late September, according to a New York Times tally, and none of their 95 ads mentioned data centres; NBC News found the early ads did not mention AI at all. When an industry's own political money avoids naming the industry, it has understood how toxic its brand has become. Data for Progress found three-quarters of battleground voters less likely to back a candidate funded by AI super PACs.
For the race between the labs, the backlash changes what winning means. Compute still matters, but so do sites that can be built, power that can be secured without raising neighbours' bills and a brand that voters do not distrust. That favours companies with long-trusted consumer brands, their own energy deals and a story about serving users, and it penalises pure-play labs that need public money for listings and public consent for construction.
The most likely path, on current evidence, is a negotiated bargain: state rules that make data centres pay their own grid costs, community benefit agreements, disclosure and safety laws, and some form of public stake in AI's gains. The signs are already visible in Microsoft's and OpenAI's concessions and in the bipartisan majorities for data-centre rules. A harder backlash, with moratoria and an AI-sceptic Congress, is plausible if the midterms on 3 November reward candidates who run against the industry. The most hopeful path, in which productivity gains reach paycheques fast enough to change the mood on their own, is the least likely in the near term; nothing in the firm-level data or the junior-hiring numbers suggests it is imminent.
The hinges to watch are specific. Do candidates who campaign against AI money win? Do more states pass data-centre rules, or does a state finally impose a moratorium? Do the frontier labs' public listings include any mechanism for public ownership? And does entry-level hiring in AI-exposed jobs recover? A clear yes on the first two would point to the harder path; a yes on the last two to the gentler one. For a deeper look at whether today's AI valuations would survive a souring public, see our AI bubble episode, number 49, from August.
Bottom line
The AI backlash is real, it is growing and it has a fitting name: AI populism. It is not a rejection of the technology, which more people use every month. It is a judgement about who the technology serves, made by a public that sees capital spending soar, share prices rise, data centres arrive and its own prospects stand still. That judgement is concentrated in the West and among the young, and it is sharpened, though not caused, by a cost-of-living squeeze that comes mainly from oil.
History suggests the public is reading the cycle correctly, and that its anger is not the end of the story but the start of its second half. Britain's workers waited sixty years for the industrial revolution to reach their wages. The decisive question for AI is whether the bargain that shares its gains can be struck in years rather than generations, and whether the industry helps write it or has it written for them.
Sources
- Pew Research Center: Young adults in the US are increasingly wary of AI (Aug. 18, 2026) — the 2021-2026 concerned-versus-excited series and job expectations.
- Pew Research Center: Concern and excitement about AI, 25 countries (Oct. 15, 2025) — the global comparison.
- Gallup: Gen Z adoption steady, skepticism climbs (Apr. 9, 2026) — Gen Z excitement, anger and use.
- Quinnipiac University poll, March 30, 2026 — 55% expect more harm than good.
- NBC News poll, March 2026 release — AI's net favourability against ICE.
- Stanford AI Index 2026, public opinion chapter — Ipsos global trend, expert-public gaps, trust in governments.
- Stanford AI Index 2025, public opinion — country shares seeing more benefits than drawbacks.
- Ipsos AI Monitor 2026 — 32-country wonder-versus-worry finding.
- Data for Progress and Guardrails Action: Midwest polling on AI (Sept. 30, 2026) — power, profits, company and Altman ratings.
- Data Center Watch: Q1 2026 report — projects blocked or delayed, opposition groups, state bills.
- AI Weekly: Data Center Watch Q2 2026 — the second-quarter tally.
- Washington Post-Schar School poll, via Anchorage Daily News (Apr. 15, 2026) — Virginia comfort, tax breaks and bills.
- Spectrum News: Marquette poll on Wisconsin data centres (Feb. 26, 2026) — Wisconsin costs versus benefits by party.
- WBUR: Maine data-centre ban vetoed (Apr. 27, 2026) — Governor Mills's veto.
- WTOP/AP: Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez data-centre moratorium bill (Mar. 25, 2026) — the national moratorium proposal.
- The New Republic: The AI industry is discovering that the public hates it (Apr. 24, 2026) — the April attacks, Microsoft's initiative, AI populism.
- ABC7: Arrest after Molotov cocktail at Sam Altman's home (Apr. 2026) — the attack and arrest.
- Dave Karpf on Jasmine Sun's "AI Populism's Warning Shot" — the term and its definition.
- ITIF: A policymaker's guide to the techlash (2019) — the origin of "techlash".
- MIT Technology Review: London's biggest anti-AI protest (Mar. 2, 2026) — the King's Cross march.
- Decrypt: Protesters rally outside OpenAI, Anthropic and xAI (Mar. 2026) — the San Francisco march.
- Society of Environmental Journalists: From Mexico to Ireland, fury mounts over a global AI frenzy — the New York Times investigation of global data-centre fights.
- Sherwood News: the 2026 Axios Harris Poll 100 — company reputations.
- Axios: Axios Harris Poll 100 and AI politics (May 19, 2026) — OpenAI's partisan reputation gap.
- Quartz: Companies whose reputations fell most in 2026 — OpenAI's and Microsoft's falls.
- Pew Research Center: How Americans view Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg (Feb. 19, 2025) — founder favourability.
- US Bureau of Labor Statistics: CPI for September 2026 — inflation by component.
- University of Arizona Eller forecast: the Hormuz crisis and gasoline prices — the 2026 oil shock.
- AI Weekly: Big Tech plans $725B of AI capex in 2026 — hyperscaler spending guidance.
- ING Think: How much is AI contributing to US economic growth? — AI's share of GDP growth.
- EconoFact: Mark Zandi on the K-shaped consumer (July 2026) — spending growth by income group.
- FRED: equity holdings by wealth group, Federal Reserve distributional accounts — who owns US stocks.
- NBER Working Paper 34836: Firm data on AI (Feb. 2026) — executives report little productivity effect so far.
- Stanford Digital Economy Lab: Canaries in the coal mine (Aug. 2026 revision) — young workers in AI-exposed jobs.
- Robert C. Allen: Engels' pause (2009) — output and wages in the British industrial revolution.
- Luddite history — the 1811-1816 machine-breaking and the 1812 Frame Breaking Act.
- Robert Solow, 1987, on Wikiquote — the productivity-paradox line.
- Economic Policy Institute: the productivity-pay gap — productivity versus typical pay since 1979.
- Next Big Idea Club: Acemoglu and Johnson on Power and Progress — the book's thesis in the authors' words.
- ScienceDaily: Income and emotional well-being, a conflict resolved (Mar. 2023) — Killingsworth, Kahneman and Mellers.
- IZA: The happiness-income paradox revisited (Easterlin et al., PNAS 2010) — national income and life satisfaction.
- Sam Altman: Moore's Law for Everything (Mar. 16, 2021) — the American Equity Fund promise.
- TechRadar: Dario Amodei on white-collar jobs (May 2025) — the entry-level jobs warning.
- University of Michigan Poverty Solutions: OpenResearch cash study results (2024) — what $1,000 a month did.
- Gallup: Public split on basic income for workers replaced by robots (2018) — the 2017 baseline.
- The Next Web: Most Americans say the public should own half of big AI companies (July 2026) — the Verasight poll.
- Just Capital: how AI-driven gains should be spent (2026) — public versus corporate priorities.
- The Decoder: OpenAI's vision for a world reshaped by superintelligence (Apr. 2026) — OpenAI's industrial-policy paper.
- AI Weekly: OpenAI- and Anthropic-aligned PACs spent $55.7M (Sept. 30, 2026) — the New York Times tally of AI super PAC ads.
- NBC News via Yahoo: Why ads funded by AI groups aren't about AI (Feb. 27, 2026) — AI money avoiding AI.
- AI Weekly: Anthropic doubles its AI policy donation to $40M — Anthropic's funding of Public First Action.
- Dan's AI Intel: Universal Basic Income Works — Just Not on the Problem AI Creates (episode 31) — our deep dive on basic-income evidence.
- Dan's AI Intel: The AI Bubble Is Real — But Only in One Layer (episode 49) — our analysis of AI valuations.
Transcript
Sam: About three in four voters in three swing states think AI will make billionaires richer. About one in five thinks it will do the same for them.
Alex: And most of those voters aren't even scared for their own jobs. That's the AI backlash: why the public turned on AI's winners.
Sam: Before we start, I want to tell you about something I found on Hacker News this week, because it's been rattling around my head. It's called Sphinx. It's a git hook, so a little gate on a developer's push, and when an AI agent has written the code, Sphinx stops the push and asks you a question about what that code actually does.
Alex: Hang on, it quizzes the human? Before the code ships?
Sam: It quizzes the human. It works with Codex, Claude Code, Cursor, plain git. Your answers never go back to the agent, so you can't just ask the robot for the answer. And there's a mode called yolo that lets pushes through, but every skip gets logged.
Alex: A skip log. That's the most honest feature I've ever heard of. Somebody knew exactly how this goes.
Sam: What got me is that I run a big team, and my junior copywriters are shipping AI drafts all day. I'd pay real money for something that makes them say out loud why the draft is right before it goes to a customer.
Alex: And that's the engineering version of my week. My reviewers are drowning. The code is fine until it isn't, and nobody on the team can say why it works. I'm going to read that repo tonight.
Sam: You will not. You'll read it late, get excited, and rewrite it in Rust.
Alex: Okay, that's a fair shot, and I'm not going to dignify it. Welcome back to Dan's AI Intel, the show that helps a curious person actually understand the AI revolution, not just keep pace with it. Each episode takes the one question that matters, digs past the hype and the fear, and asks what it means for the economy, for politics and for the race between the labs. I'm Alex.
Sam: And I'm Sam. And this week the question is a strange one. People are using AI more every month, and liking it less every month. So who, exactly, is the public angry at?
Alex: We'll start with a name for the movement, and a very bad week in April. Then we go to the building that turned an abstract technology into a neighbour. We'll cross the Pacific, because the mood flips there. We'll look at which companies are absorbing the anger, and whether the obvious suspect, prices, is even the right one. Then a trip to nineteenth-century England, a detour into money and happiness, and we finish on whether there's a deal on the table.
Sam: And if you're enjoying the show, hit follow in whatever app you're in. It's one tap, it's free, and the next one just shows up.
Alex: Before we get into it, though, I want to plant a flag. My honest starting position is that this anger is aimed at the wrong thing.
Sam: Oh, here we go.
Alex: Hear me out. People use these tools. My engineers use them, the whole under-thirty crowd uses them, half the country opens one every week. What people hate isn't the product, it's the press tour. It's executives talking about replacing work on a stage. I'm a builder. I think shipping beats announcing, and my view is that if the gains show up in people's actual lives, the mood follows.
Sam: And I think the part that matters is the exact opposite. I sign off my team's AI tool budget, I know every line to the cent, and I'm the person who has to tell a whole department what this means for them. The anger isn't a misunderstanding of the product. It's a very sensible reading of who keeps the money. If it's about power, no better product fixes it.
Alex: So you think it's rational, and I think it's misdirected.
Sam: I think you think the problem is communications.
Alex: That's a little unfair. And a little accurate. We'll see who moves.
Sam: So, the name. Everybody's heard techlash.
Alex: Which is old now. The Economist used it more than a decade ago, and it made the Oxford Dictionaries word of the year shortlist a few years after that. But techlash was about privacy and social media and monopoly. What's forming around AI is broader, and more political.
Sam: And the word that's stuck this year comes from a writer, Jasmine Sun, who put out an essay in April called AI Populism's Warning Shot. Her idea is that people don't see AI as something you adopt. They see it as an elite political project you resist.
Alex: And that essay landed after the worst week the industry has had. A young man threw a Molotov cocktail at Altman's house in San Francisco. A gate caught fire. He was arrested an hour later at OpenAI's headquarters.
Sam: The New Republic reported he'd written a manifesto calling for violence against AI executives, and called himself a butlerian jihadist, which is a Dune reference, the war on thinking machines.
Alex: Days earlier, somebody fired a volley of shots into the Indianapolis home of a city councillor, Ron Gibson, who'd backed a local data centre project. There was a note on the door. It said no data centers.
Sam: That's grim. And I want to be careful here, because those are extreme outliers. A handful of people. The real evidence isn't in the violence, it's in the polling.
Alex: Good, because the polling is the interesting part. In September, Data for Progress surveyed thousands of likely voters across Iowa, Michigan and Ohio. Majorities in all three states had an unfavourable view of the AI industry, and about three in four disagreed that AI executives care about people like them.
Sam: But here's the part that stopped me. Only about two in five of the working voters were worried about their own job. Roughly half rarely or never used AI at all. And among the people who said AI had touched their lives, far more called it good than bad.
Alex: So it's not personal experience, and it's not job fear.
Sam: It's about who profits, who's watching and who's in charge. And that's what you said you didn't buy, Alex. People aren't confused about the tool.
Alex: I'll take the hit on the first round. But notice what the data doesn't say. It doesn't say the product is the problem, and it doesn't say builders can't do anything.
Sam: Noted. You're still wrong.
Alex: Provisionally, partially wrong.
Sam: Can I push on one thing? Does the violence poison the well?
Alex: For the people who were never going to listen, yes. It lets the industry say it's all cranks.
Sam: And that's the trap. If the industry decides the story is a few cranks, it never has to read the polls.
Alex: Same mistake as a company deciding every angry customer is a troll. My support team learned that one the hard way.
Sam: Mine too. The loudest complaint is rarely the most representative, but the quiet ones just leave.
Alex: And the quiet ones are what a poll is.
Sam: Should we call it a Luddite thing? Because I've heard that a lot.
Alex: Neo-Luddite misreads it, and I'll come back to the actual Luddites, because it turns out I have feelings about them. Most of the critics aren't trying to smash the machines.
Sam: And the phrase AI populism earns its keep because it puts the fight where the data says it is, between a public and an elite it thinks is capturing a technology.
Alex: Which tells you what would answer it. Not a better product. A different deal.
Sam: And there's another reason it's not just a mood. Building AI at the scale the labs plan needs land, grid connections, water, tax treatment, and the permission of elected officials. Every one of those runs through voters who are souring.
Alex: I run an engineering org, so I'll say it in my terms. I've been planning compute like it's a purchase order. It's not. It's a permit, and a permit is a political object.
Sam: And the labs are heading to public listings, which turns ordinary investors into owners, right when the industry's own political money is pouring into the midterms.
Alex: So the mood is now a constraint on the build-out. That's why this is an episode and not a tweet.
Sam: And why I stopped skimming the polling emails my analytics team sends me.
Alex: You were skimming them?
Sam: I was skimming them like a person who thought this was a sentiment story. It's a supply chain story.
Alex: For most people AI is something on a screen. A data centre is a building the size of several football fields at the end of your road, pulling as much power as a small city. That's where the populism got a face.
Sam: And the scale of the pushback is new. A tracker called Data Center Watch counted dozens of projects, worth over a hundred billion dollars, blocked or delayed in just the first few months of this year. That's roughly as much as all of last year.
Alex: Opposition groups more than doubled since the end of last year, and they're in nearly every state now.
Sam: Hundreds of state bills in the first weeks of the year. Moratorium proposals in over a dozen states. And a second tally added tens of billions more in the disrupted column, though that one mixes delays with outright cancellations, so I'd hold it loosely.
Alex: Here's the one I keep coming back to. Virginia. Data Center Alley, the cluster that hosts more of this than anywhere. The Washington Post and the Schar School polled registered voters there in March. Back in 2023, about seven in ten were comfortable with a new data centre nearby. Now it's about one in three.
Sam: Fewer than half as many. And support for the tax breaks used to lure them collapsed right alongside.
Alex: Same poll, a majority said data centres hurt household energy bills, and only a sliver said they help. Though a majority still credit them with creating jobs.
Sam: Which is what makes it so interesting. They're not saying there's no upside. They're saying the upside isn't theirs.
Alex: And the comparison that got me was nuclear. A few years back, only about a third of Americans said they'd be comfortable with a nuclear power plant nearby. Data centres are approaching that level of local tolerance.
Sam: A reactor and a server farm, neck and neck.
Alex: Not saying it's a perfect comparison.
Sam: It's an excellent comparison for a dinner party.
Alex: It's a decent one for a board meeting, too. Whatever I write in a capacity plan, the answer that matters is whether the town says yes.
Sam: And this one lands for me, because my sister Claire lives in a small town east of Atlanta where one of these is going up on old farmland. She and her husband own a few acres close to the site. She goes to the county meetings. She reads the minutes. She's the only person I know who reads minutes for fun.
Alex: What does she say?
Sam: That every promise gets repeated at every meeting, and none of them shows up next to her power bill. Georgia Power has publicly pledged that residential customers won't pay for data centre growth. They've talked about a rate freeze. But customers say their bills have climbed by tens of dollars a month since 2023, and critics point at a February filing about gas plants for data centres in a couple of counties.
Alex: And how much of that is the data centres is contested.
Sam: It is. The utility says one thing, advocates say another, and nobody can sort that out from the passenger seat. But the point isn't who's right about the bill. The point is a family next to the fence has decided they're paying for something that isn't theirs.
Alex: That's the cleanest version of the whole populism argument. When the costs are local and visible and the gains are distant and private, consent evaporates.
Sam: Okay, but who pays for that? Because that's what Claire asks, and nobody at the meeting answers it.
Alex: Which is why the move companies are starting to make is the interesting one. Microsoft launched what it calls Community-First AI Infrastructure in January. It promises to cover the utility costs its sites create and limit water use. No independent oversight, though.
Sam: And OpenAI's April policy paper floated the same idea: data centres paying their own energy costs and bringing local jobs and tax revenue.
Alex: Every one of those promises is the industry quietly conceding the point. You're offering a town a share of the gains, not only a share of the noise.
Sam: Which is what I've been saying. A bargaining position, not a misunderstanding.
Alex: I'll let you have that one for now.
Sam: Think of it like a neighbour who throws a huge party. The music's loud, the street's full of cars, and then he hands you the cleanup bill.
Alex: And you weren't invited, and you've noticed he's very rich.
Sam: That's the vibe in the minutes.
Alex: Microsoft's pledge has a gap in it, though. Nobody outside checks it.
Sam: A promise with no audit is a press release in a hard hat.
Alex: You've been saving that one.
Sam: Since the morning I read the announcement.
Alex: It's now at the top of national politics. In March, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez introduced a bill for a national moratorium on new AI data centres until federal rules exist.
Sam: Which has very little chance of passing. And Interior Secretary Doug Burgum called a moratorium a surrender flag to China.
Alex: Then in April, Maine's legislature passed the first statewide pause on new data centres above a modest size. Governor Janet Mills vetoed it, and not because she disagreed. It lacked an exemption for a half-billion-dollar project in the town of Jay. She said she still favoured a moratorium.
Sam: Think about that. A governor vetoes the pause because it would've hit one project in one town, and says she still wants the pause.
Alex: And in Wisconsin, the Marquette Law School poll found the share saying data centres' costs outweigh their benefits went from a bit over half last October to about seventy percent in February and a little higher by July. The swing came from Democrats and independents. Republicans were already sceptical.
Sam: So it isn't one party's issue. That's the part that scares me, as someone who's supposed to be calm and strategic. It's bipartisan and it's getting stronger.
Alex: Yeah. I go quiet when I see a curve like Wisconsin's.
Sam: This is the part that confirmed it for me. Pew has asked the same question since 2021. Does the increased use of AI in daily life make you more concerned or more excited?
Alex: Back then about a third said more concerned. Now it's over half. And the excited share has shrunk to under one in ten.
Sam: And the shape matters. The jump came in a single year, the year generative AI hit the mass market, and concern has never come back down. This year, for the first time, a majority of Americans under thirty said they were more concerned than excited.
Alex: Gallup's survey with the Walton Family Foundation found Gen Z's excitement dropped in a single year, and anger now sits above excitement.
Sam: Which is my daughter's generation. Maya is a junior, she's starting to think about colleges, and she uses AI every day to quiz herself and plan essays. She's also the angriest person at our dinner table about it. Both of those are true at once, and I used to think that was a contradiction.
Alex: It isn't. It's the whole story. Pew found most Americans expect AI to mean fewer jobs over the next couple of decades, and that share has grown. Quinnipiac found a majority expected more harm than good in their daily lives, up sharply in under a year.
Sam: And NBC had far more voters viewing AI negatively than positively, a net rating slightly below Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Pew had it... no wait, that was NBC. I keep mixing the two up.
Alex: You said Pew and meant NBC. The five-year question is Pew. The ICE comparison is NBC.
Sam: Thank you, I'll put that on the wall.
Alex: And you run a team that writes copy.
Sam: Which is why I have an editor.
Alex: The Stanford AI Index put the cleanest gap on paper. Almost three in four AI experts expect AI to be good for how people do their jobs, against fewer than one in four Americans.
Sam: And on the economy the gap is just as wide. Most experts expect a positive effect. Hardly anyone else does.
Alex: And I'll admit this is the one that makes me uncomfortable, because by that definition I'm an expert. There's a post on Hacker News this week quoting a Meta engineer. He said he's never felt this uncomfortable doing his job. The code feels like a black box, and the pace of shipping is moving so fast that checking every line isn't possible.
Sam: So even inside the building the consent is thin.
Alex: Even my own engineers say it, in quieter words. The people who understand this best are less sure they control it. That's a cousin of what voters are saying: the system around the tool doesn't feel like it was built with them in mind.
Sam: And here's the paradox you need to say out loud, Alex. Use is rising. NBC found over half of voters had used an AI platform recently. Gallup found half of Gen Z uses it weekly.
Alex: So what I said at the top, that the anger is aimed at the wrong thing, doesn't survive this. If it were about the product, usage would fall with approval.
Sam: You're conceding.
Alex: I'm conceding that a better product doesn't fix the mood. I thought if the gains reached people the mood would follow. But the mood has already come apart from the gains people can see in their own hands. That's a reason, and it moved me.
Sam: Write that down. Did the room hear that? Alex Rivera changed his mind, with a reason.
Alex: Don't get used to it. I haven't said who writes the deal.
Sam: Now here's what complicates the story, and I love that it does. This isn't a global slide into pessimism.
Alex: Ipsos runs the biggest annual cross-country survey. The share saying AI products offer more benefits than drawbacks actually rose in a year, even as the share saying it makes them nervous edged up too. Their latest edition is even wider, and excitement and nervousness are about level worldwide, often inside the same person.
Sam: And the geography is stark. In China, Indonesia and Thailand, around four in five adults see more benefit than harm. In Canada, the United States and the Netherlands it's about two in five.
Alex: Pew's survey across a couple dozen countries had about half in the United States, Italy, Australia, Brazil and Greece more concerned than excited. South Korea was among the lowest.
Sam: And trust in your own government to regulate it. In Singapore and Indonesia, most people have it. The United States came dead last of every country surveyed.
Alex: There are exceptions that make me suspicious of any tidy story. Germany and France actually warmed since 2022. And India is the one to watch, because nervousness there rose faster in a single year than anywhere else surveyed.
Sam: So what's the pattern?
Alex: Where AI arrives with rising incomes, trusted governments and a feeling of national ascent, the public is optimistic. Where it arrives on top of stagnant wages, low trust and visible inequality, the same technology reads as a threat. The backlash tracks the social contract more than the software.
Sam: That's the line I'd put on a slide. And as a marketer I hate that no amount of copy fixes it.
Alex: The physical fights are global too. A New York Times investigation traced them from Mexico, where residents near a Microsoft site reported water outages lasting weeks, to Ireland, where campaigners won limits on new data centres around Dublin.
Sam: In Chile, Google dropped plans for a data centre in Cerrillos after protests about water use in a drought-stricken area. And in London, PauseAI and Pull the Plug led what MIT Technology Review called the city's biggest anti-AI march yet, a few hundred people through King's Cross. In San Francisco a similar crowd marched past the offices of Anthropic, OpenAI and xAI.
Alex: A few hundred. I want to be straight about that. It's the biggest, and it's a few hundred.
Sam: Which is why I think the polls matter more than the marches.
Alex: Agreed. Marches are a headline. A poll in Virginia is a permit.
Sam: So who's absorbing this? Because nobody tracks each AI company with the same question over years. The public formed views faster than the pollsters could measure them.
Alex: Piecing it together, OpenAI is the best known and the most exposed. In the battleground survey, a majority of voters in all three states viewed it unfavourably. Altman is unknown to about three in five voters, but the ones who know him are negative. His net rating was around minus twenty in every state.
Sam: And in the Axios Harris Poll 100, the big corporate reputation ranking out in May, OpenAI fell by double digits, going by Quartz's reading of it. And it turned partisan. Republicans now rate it well above Democrats, where two years ago there was almost no gap.
Alex: Its president, Greg Brockman, is a major funder of Leading the Future, the super PAC fighting state AI rules. Which matters, because the company's most visible faces and its political money point the same way voters already distrust.
Sam: Anthropic is the interesting one for me, because it sells itself as the safety-first lab. It's reportedly committed tens of millions of dollars to Public First Action, a group pushing for guardrails.
Alex: And it didn't buy a premium. About half of battleground voters hadn't heard enough to rate it, and the ones who had leaned negative. Being the pro-regulation lab hasn't bought it goodwill yet.
Sam: Meta carries an older deficit. Two-thirds of Americans viewed Zuckerberg unfavourably in Pew's survey last year. Musk is polarising rather than simply unpopular, split sharply by party, and Tesla's reputation actually rebounded this year.
Alex: Microsoft, the company most tied to OpenAI, dropped more than twenty places in the ranking. And then there are the firms that kept their standing. Nvidia sat near the very top. Apple, Alphabet and Amazon scored very good.
Sam: Because they sell things people already understand.
Alex: Reputation follows who a company appears to serve. The labs whose product is AI itself, whose founders talk openly about replacing work and whose valuations depend on it, are taking the anger.
Sam: And as someone who has to choose which of these vendors my brand sits beside, that's not abstract. I do not want my pet food company's name next to a lab voters think is eating their jobs.
Alex: That's a real stake. Mine is the opposite. I need these vendors to still be standing in three years, and a lab that needs public consent to build and public money to list is a vendor risk I'd never put on a slide before this year.
Sam: I notice the same thing from marketing. The brands people forgive show up in their life as an actual thing, not a promise.
Alex: Shoes get forgiven. Models don't.
Sam: Shoes don't give interviews about replacing your job.
Alex: Mine would be an odd company if they did. Anyway, that makes it a vendor risk.
Sam: So your board should be reading polls.
Alex: My board is going to be reading polls. Here's the intuition I hear everywhere, including at my own dinner table. AI is sucking capital out of everything else and pushing prices up for everyone.
Sam: And I'll own it, that was mine too. I assume the worst about pricing. If a bill is up, it's the data centres.
Alex: The evidence backs half of it. The capital is real. The four biggest cloud companies, Amazon, Microsoft, Alphabet and Meta, guided this spring to roughly seven hundred billion dollars of spending this year, up from about four hundred billion last year.
Sam: And ING estimates AI investment accounts for roughly a third of US growth this year. The IMF credits it with holding up growth worldwide.
Alex: So it's propping the economy up. But this year's price squeeze has another main cause. Inflation hit three point seven in September, but strip out food and energy and it's well below that. Energy was up around a fifth, gasoline by about a third, after Iran's Revolutionary Guard declared the Strait of Hormuz closed in March.
Sam: And electricity, where data centres really do add pressure, rose about four percent. Under the headline.
Alex: So the fuel shock is the big story. How much of the electricity move is data centres, versus fuel costs and grid upgrades, is disputed, and public data can't cleanly separate them.
Sam: So my worst-case pricing theory is half wrong.
Alex: Sam Okafor, assumes the worst about pricing, learns the worst is mostly oil.
Sam: I'm taking the correction and I'm still angry. Because the perception isn't irrational.
Alex: Go on.
Sam: Mark Zandi at Moody's estimates that over three years, real spending by the top fifth of households grew by about four percent, and everyone below them saw close to zero. And the Federal Reserve's numbers show the top one percent hold about half the stock Americans own, directly or indirectly. The bottom half holds almost none.
Alex: So the boom shows up in share prices, and most people don't own the shares. It's a party with a guest list.
Sam: And the payoff hasn't reached most firms either. A February study from the National Bureau of Economic Research asked thousands of executives in four countries. About nine in ten reported no effect on productivity or employment over three years.
Alex: That one lands on my desk. I defend an AI budget to a board, and the straight answer to what we got for it is we're still learning. Not a great answer.
Sam: So AI isn't causing the cost-of-living crisis. It's making a small group very rich during one, and its benefits to everyone else are a forecast.
Alex: Which is exactly the condition for a fairness backlash. And the costs land on the young first. My son Diego graduated in May. He's working shifts at a running store and applying for first jobs, and the rent takes more than half his pay. His loan payments start in November.
Sam: Oh, Alex.
Alex: He's fine. He's resourceful. But it's why this finding doesn't read like a statistic to me. Stanford's Digital Economy Lab found employment of workers in their early twenties in the most AI-exposed occupations is now nearly a fifth below where it would have been, and the gap has widened since the study's first version.
Sam: A ResumeBuilder survey of recent graduates found about two-thirds had been ghosted after interviews. That's one survey, so I won't lean on it. The New York Fed had recent-graduate unemployment well above the national rate at the end of last year.
Alex: And Indeed's economist called the market low-hire, low-fire. Nobody's being let go, nobody's being let in.
Sam: Which is what I said last time. The first rung is missing.
Alex: And last time I said the economic part is fixable. I'm less sure after today. If the first rung is gone, the fix isn't a product. It's a different arrangement of who gets hired and who gets the gains.
Sam: A different arrangement. You're talking like a populist.
Alex: Talking like a father who owns a spreadsheet.
Sam: So you promised to come back to the Luddites.
Alex: I did, and before you say it, this is not a tangent.
Sam: It's the beginning of a tangent. You get a certain voice.
Alex: It's a historically relevant tangent. In 1811, textile workers in Nottinghamshire started breaking the knitting frames that were undercutting their trade. They weren't against machinery as such. They went after the machines owners used to cut wages and skill. Parliament made frame-breaking a capital offence the next year, and the mass trials at York ended in executions and transportation to Australia.
Sam: And the name became an insult for anyone afraid of technology, which is a misreading of what they fought about.
Alex: They fought about distribution. And what they lived through has a name. The economic historian Robert Allen called it Engels' pause, after Friedrich Engels, who described the misery of Manchester's workers in the middle of the century.
Sam: Give me the number.
Alex: Over sixty years, output per worker in Britain rose by nearly half. Real wages rose by about an eighth.
Sam: Sixty years.
Alex: Sixty years where the gains went to profits. Then in the next sixty, wages finally outran output. Historians still argue about the exact figures because the wage series are reconstructed, but the shape is accepted. Allen's explanation is that owners captured the return, and wages caught up only once capital piled up enough to make labour scarce and employers had to bid for it.
Sam: Picture a bakery that doubles its ovens and keeps the wages where they were. The bread piles up, the owner gets rich, and the bakers wait.
Alex: For a couple of generations.
Sam: And you can feel the modern version in my building. Nobody's smashing frames. They just quietly stop trusting that the tool is on their side.
Alex: Not sabotage, withdrawal.
Sam: And it's rational. If the draft you write with the tool is really the tool's draft, whose promotion is it?
Alex: That's the Luddite question in a hoodie. Who owns the skill once the machine has it? So the public's pessimism isn't ignorance. It's an accurate read of the first phase of a general-purpose technology.
Sam: And the backlash is not a detour.
Alex: On Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson's reading, it's the mechanism. Their book, Power and Progress, runs that pattern across a thousand years. Technology raises output, but gains get shared only when the direction of innovation and the split of proceeds are pushed away from a narrow elite.
Sam: And they later shared a Nobel for their work on institutions.
Alex: The Luddites lost their fight. Workers' gains came later, as their bargaining power grew. The question for AI is whether the bargaining happens in decades, like then, or faster.
Sam: The computer age rhymed with this, didn't it?
Alex: A milder rhyme. In 1987 Robert Solow wrote that you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics. When productivity did arrive in the late nineties, it was shared unevenly. The Economic Policy Institute calculates that US productivity has risen by close to ninety percent since 1979, while a typical worker's hourly pay rose by about a third.
Sam: And you were in the middle of that.
Alex: Back in oh-one, I was building a start-up and I'd have told you every dollar pouring in was infrastructure for a shared future. I meant it. The infrastructure was real. The sharing took a while.
Sam: The man who had a spectacular failure lecturing us on how history rhymes.
Alex: That was a different failure, thank you. Later and louder.
Sam: Let me say what it means for Monday. I can't fix who gets the gains of an industrial revolution. But my team asks me every month whether they're on the right side of this, and I can't say yes because the tool is good.
Alex: And I can't tell my engineers to be patient for sixty years.
Sam: Yeah. That's the whole problem with it, as a boss. There's a strand here I didn't expect. The grandest promise for AI isn't only abundance, it's flourishing. Everyone's rich and fulfilled. Behind it sits an assumption that wealth and happiness move together.
Alex: For individuals, they mostly do. A few years ago, Matthew Killingsworth, Daniel Kahneman and Barbara Mellers settled a long dispute in the journal PNAS. The older claim was that happiness stops rising at a modest income. Re-analysing a big sample of real-time mood reports, they found it keeps rising with income, even at high incomes. Only for the least happy fifth does extra money stop helping, because what makes them unhappy is something money can't fix.
Sam: For whole nations it's weaker. The economist Richard Easterlin found, across dozens of countries, that over a decade or more rising national income didn't bring rising life satisfaction. Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers dispute that.
Alex: But the common explanation is that people judge their lives against other people, and they value security and control as well as consumption. When everyone gets richer together, the comparison doesn't change.
Sam: And if AI lifts the average but concentrates the gains, and people lose control over their work and their towns, you could be richer on paper and unhappier in fact.
Alex: What people object to is a loss of standing and say, not a lack of gadgets. That one sentence explains the county meetings and the rent at once.
Sam: Abundance alone doesn't buy consent. Security, dignity, a fair share. That is not a marketing problem.
Alex: You say that like you've tried.
Sam: I've tried. Everyone in my job has tried.
Alex: The industry's leaders once offered an answer. Years ago, Altman published an essay called Moore's Law for Everything. It proposed an American Equity Fund, financed by an annual levy on the market value of large companies and on private land. He estimated it would pay each American adult thousands of dollars a year within a decade.
Sam: And last year, Dario Amodei, who runs Anthropic, warned that AI could eliminate half of entry-level white-collar jobs within five years and push unemployment into double digits.
Alex: The evidence on basic income itself is more modest than either the dream or its critics suggest. OpenResearch, a lab Altman funded, gave a thousand low-income Americans a thousand dollars a month for three years. Recipients worked a little less, spent more on essentials, helped relatives, and their mental-health gains faded after the first year.
Sam: We went deep on that in our episode on universal basic income, number thirty-one, back in July. The short version: cash reliably eases poverty, but it can't replace the purpose and status that work gives.
Alex: What's collapsed isn't the appetite for sharing. It's faith that the gains will be shared voluntarily. Years earlier, a Gallup-Northeastern survey had Americans split almost down the middle on a basic income for workers displaced by AI.
Sam: In June, a Verasight poll found about seven in ten backed requiring large AI firms to hand half their stock to a public wealth fund. And most still did when the idea was attributed to Bernie Sanders. Just Capital found about two-thirds think everyone should get a direct financial benefit from the wealth AI companies generate.
Alex: And in the battleground states, majorities including Republicans supported a basic income funded by a tax on AI companies.
Sam: Meanwhile OpenAI's April paper, Industrial Policy for the Intelligence Age, floated a Public Wealth Fund, higher taxes on top capital gains and on sustained AI-driven returns, and pilots of a shorter work week at full pay.
Alex: Critics noted it didn't say how the fund would be financed.
Sam: So a fund that isn't funded, from a company whose own president bankrolls a super PAC against state rules. That's not shipping, Alex. That's a press release.
Alex: I'd defend it more if it had a repo. Though I'll defend the instinct. A public wealth fund is at least an admission the question is on the table. For years the industry's answer was that growth would solve it.
Sam: Growth solves nothing if the person it's growing for never sees it. I've watched a company's revenue climb for years while my team's budget stayed flat.
Alex: That's a CFO problem as much as a distribution problem.
Sam: It's the same problem at every scale. The lesson is the one Acemoglu and Johnson draw. Shared prosperity is negotiated, not gifted. The public has absorbed that faster than the industry.
Alex: The dream hasn't died. It's changed hands, from a gift the builders would give to a claim the public intends to make.
Sam: Which brings us to the midterms, on the third of November. The two industry-aligned networks, Leading the Future on one side and the Anthropic-funded Public First on the other, had spent tens of millions by late September, according to a New York Times tally.
Alex: And none of their ads mentioned data centres. NBC found the early ads didn't mention AI at all.
Sam: When an industry's own political money avoids naming the industry, it has understood how toxic its brand has become. And Data for Progress found three in four battleground voters less likely to back a candidate funded by AI super PACs.
Alex: It changes what winning means for the labs. Compute still matters. So do sites that can be built, power that can be secured without raising neighbours' bills, and a brand voters don't distrust.
Sam: Which favours the companies with old trusted consumer brands and their own energy deals.
Alex: And it penalises pure-play labs that need public money for listings and public consent for construction. We covered the valuation side of this in our AI bubble episode, number forty-nine, back in August.
Sam: The most likely path, on the current evidence, is a negotiated bargain. State rules making data centres pay their own grid costs, community benefit agreements, disclosure and safety laws, some public stake in the gains.
Alex: A harder backlash is plausible if the midterms reward candidates who run against the industry. Moratoria and a sceptical Congress. And the gentlest path, where the productivity gains reach paycheques fast enough to change the mood on their own, is the least likely near-term. Nothing in the firm-level data or the junior-hiring numbers says it's imminent.
Sam: And the signposts are specific. Do candidates who campaign against AI money win? Do more states pass data-centre rules, or does one finally impose a moratorium? Do the labs' listings include any mechanism for public ownership? And does entry-level hiring in AI-exposed jobs recover?
Alex: A clear yes on the first two says the harder road. A yes on the last two says the gentler one.
Sam: And on Monday, for me, the move is boring. I stop buying tools that promise to replace a person, I buy the ones that make my person better, and I say so out loud to my team.
Alex: Mine is to treat power and permission as line items in every build plan, not assumptions. And to stop talking about replacing work in rooms where my engineers can hear.
Sam: That one's free.
Alex: It's the cheapest item on the roadmap.
Sam: And this is where we end up not agreeing. Say yours.
Alex: Here's the thing. I came in thinking the anger was misdirected, and the use-up, approval-down pattern took that away from me. It's a claim on the gains, and it's a fair one. But I still think the industry can write part of the answer before a legislature does. Builders who put a site fee and a share of the gains on the table first will end up with better towns than the ones who wait to be forced.
Sam: I don't believe that. Not because builders are bad people. Because every dividend a town like that one has seen arrived after the meetings, not before. A voluntary gift is something you can withdraw. A law, you can read. I came in saying no product fixes this and I'm leaving there. You moved me on one point: prices. I was blaming the wrong bill.
Alex: So I moved on the cause, you moved on the bill, and we split on who writes the deal.
Sam: And I'd rather split honestly than agree early.
Alex: That's the most Sam sentence ever said.
Sam: It's on a mug. If you take three things from this, the first is that the backlash isn't about whether AI works. People use it more every month and approve of it less, and that gap is the sign it's about power.
Alex: Second, the anger is concentrated in the West and among the young. It's sharpened, not caused, by a price squeeze that comes mainly from oil. And it has a physical target: the data centre in somebody's town.
Sam: Third, history says this is the first half of a longer cycle. Britain's workers waited sixty years for the revolution to reach their wages. The question is whether the bargain gets struck in years or in generations, and whether the industry helps write it.
Alex: I hope you came away understanding a little more about where this is heading. It's a genuinely strange moment, and the horizon on what anyone can know is very short, and that's what makes it worth following closely.
Sam: One honest note on how this is made. It's AI-generated. Dan builds a custom stack of AI tools to research, analyse, verify and illustrate the questions worth understanding, mostly to learn them himself, and he publishes it for anyone who'd like to follow along. AI-assisted, fact-checked, worth a second look.
Alex: Before we go, one useful thing you can do: follow the show.
Sam: Whatever app you're listening in, there's a follow button or a plus sign.
Alex: One tap, and it's free. You get each new episode the moment it lands.
Sam: And for a small independent show, a follow is the biggest single thing that helps it reach other people trying to make sense of all this. So if this was worth your time, tap it now.
Alex: One more thing. The Virginia poll that flipped from seven in ten to one in three, and the British chart where wages trail output for sixty years, are laid out as pictures on connectiveshift.com.
Sam: They're free, they take a minute, and seeing the two curves next to each other makes this whole episode click.
Alex: Thanks so much for listening.
Sam: We'll see you next time.